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From the Imaginary to the Real: The Back and Forth Between Reality and 
Simulation 
Harvey Whitehouse, Ken Kahn, Michael E. Hochberg, and Joanna J. Bryson  
 
We are grateful to all the respondents for their insightful commentaries. Many clearly 
welcome the dialogue we were hoping our article would facilitate between modelers 
and social scientists. The intention of our article was to present a case study that 
primarily has value in advancing a specific area of religious study, and secondarily value 
in discussing open methodological issues on the role and practice of social simulation in 
the humanities and social sciences.  We thank our reviewers for their many observations 
and for improving and broadening the scope of our contribution with their arguments 
and many useful references to previous work.  
 
We appreciate the efforts Chattoe-Brown and McCorkle & Lane have made to 
document previous work in their commentaries. We of course never claimed to be the 
first to use agent-based modeling (ABM) to study religious phenomena, nor to be 
offering a complete review of the technique. We also did not claim to be the first to say 
that a model is a well-specified theory, and in fact cited two texts that do provide more 
extensive reviews on this matter (Bryson et al., 2007; Kokko, 2007).  It is worth noting 
though that a “growing consensus” on this approach is by no means an indication of 
unanimity.  There are still many who hold with Axelrod’s (1997, p. 4) statement that 
ABM is “a third way to do science... Whereas the purpose of induction is to find patterns 
in data and that of deduction is to find consequences of assumptions, the purpose of 
agent-based modeling is to aid intuition.  Agent-based modeling is a way of doing 
thought experiments.” Czachesz also provides a critique of contemporary researchers 
applying this approach. Those of us promoting the model-as-theory approach to ABM 
believe that this perspective both underestimates the utility of simulations and 
overestimates the formality and certainty of the standard scientific methods for 
deducing predictions from theories.  Viewing model building as exactly theory building 
demands more rigor from the models while simultaneously facilitating the scientific 
process in novel ways. The discussion section we provide (“Recalibrating the DMR 
Theory”) is intended to contribute not only to the DMR theory but also methodologically 
to the scientific application of ABM, by demonstrating good practice in model outcome 
communication and by validating through demonstration the model-as-theory 
approach.  
 
We thank Costopoulos and Hooper both for drawing attention to a more unusual 
feature of our paper – that we seek to bring together salient features of cognition, 
behavior, and cultural systems in our models rather than to treat these features in 
isolation. We agree in principle with Costopolous that this approach has the potential to 
go further still by providing novel insights into the mechanisms and processes of 
selection governing sociocultural evolution. In practice, however, there is a 
computational cost to this complexity of modeling that affects not only the speed that a 
simulation can run but also the complexity of its results particularly where those are 
combined with learning and evolution.  This is why the primary goal of Model 1 has 
been to use ABMs as a way of examining the internal consistency of our theories.  
Model 2 in contrast looks at long-term dynamics, but therefore is a far simpler model of 
the religion and agents.  Both models are hybrids of course, looking at the dynamic 
functioning of features of a system both in place and over time, but each has different 
emphases to allow the detailed exploration of different parts of the problem.  
 
By standard scientific practice a model / theory should only be exactly as complex as 
necessary to simulate / explain the phenomenon it intends to address.  Some of our 
commentators seem uncomfortable with this basic aspect of scientific method.  We can 
see this in the critique of the agents in our models raised in different ways by Geller and 
Czachesz. Geller argues that the semantic networks in Model 1 lack a motivational 
component and “since there is no pulse of life in the simulation, there is no purpose for 
these agents to reason in religious terms”. These comments, however, present 
something of a puzzle. Each node in the semantic network was explicitly accorded a 
motivational value that was a function of its combined psychological properties 
(emotional salience and intuitiveness) and its frequency of activation (motivational force 
declining as frequency increases). So we are at a loss to understand Geller’s point about 
lack of ‘purpose’ or ‘pulse of life’. Costopoulos is perturbed by the level of detail in our 
models and the number of unjustified assumptions. But there are no new assumptions 
here that have not been previously published – in fact, if anything there are fewer and 
the models are more detailed.  It is unfortunately common that when scientists and 
philosophers see their ideas really spelled out in a detailed model they may not 
recognize them, seeing suddenly only the deficits, gaps and lack of detail.  All models, 
indeed all theories and all science, take place at a level of abstraction. This is the goal of 
science, to abstract what matters – what is predictive of the future – from causally 
irrelevant (or less relevant) details of everyday life and the physical world.  Hooper 
makes this point well. That a simulation brings out the complexity of the system and its 
assumptions is useful and can hopefully accelerate progress improving the DMR theory. 
This is not to say that there are no gaps or unwarranted assumptions in our model, or 
scope for alternative hypotheses.  Of course there is much more work to be done 
beyond the contributions demonstrated here. Indeed several extensions and 
improvements have been proposed by other commentators on our paper (e.g. 
McCorkle & Lane and Komarova, see below). 
 
According to Czachesz, there are conceptual problems with our attribution of 
motivation to agents. He suggests that these problems have been solved by the 
psychological research he cites, but does not specify what the problems are (still less 
how they have been overcome by psychologists). Later he returns to the issue of 
motivation: “If we set aside the conceptual problems with “motivation” (see above), 
there remains a serious concern with regard to its measurement in the model.” Thus, 
the nature of the alleged conceptual problems is never stated, only set aside in order to 
address issues of measurement instead. According to Czachesz we have proposed that 
motivation levels regulate the stability of the group (we presume he means here the 
stability of the group’s beliefs). Nevertheless, Czachesz continues, “what if fifty percent 
of the group has very high motivation, whereas the other fifty percent has very low 
motivation? This presents a perfect scenario for schism, or at least for serious inner 
conflict”. It is not clear that this is a concern about measurement of motivation levels 
per se, but rather about what levels of uniformity of motivational states in a population 
can be assumed by the model. We have assumed that the continual repetition of ritual 
and creed over time gradually erodes motivation levels and does so quite uniformly with 
a given community as a whole (the so-called ‘tedium effect’, in support of which we 
cited empirical evidence). Owing to this uniformity, periodic efforts to advance 
unorthodox beliefs are crushed by consensus when motivation levels are high and, by 
the same token, embraced by consensus when motivation levels are low. Does this 
mean our model could not account for schism? We think not, because communities 
differ in terms of motivational levels even if internally they tend towards motivational 
homogeneity. If we were to enlarge the Kivung model to include not only groups 
undergoing splintering but other groups within the mainstream movement that are not, 
it would be obvious that splinter groups are schisms in that wider context (as the notion 
of ‘splintering’ of course implies). While we might debate the empirical evidence for 
these assumptions in our model, we think Czachesz’s concerns about the way we 
measure motivation are unfounded. 
 
The commentary by Czachesz raises a number of other issues that would seem to reflect 
misunderstandings. For instance, he argues that recent developments in the study of 
memory have cast doubt on the cognitive foundations of the modes theory. Although 
Czachesz does not say what these recent developments are, or why they pose problems 
for the modes theory, he argues that they result in our ‘minimizing’ the role of memory 
in our theories of both doctrinal and imagistic dynamics. With regard to the doctrinal 
mode, what we actually say in the article is that “high-frequency ritual performances 
allow complex networks of ideas to be transmitted and stored in semantic memory”. In 
the model itself memory is one of our key parameters: “the frequency of exposure to a 
given node in the network will impact both memory and motivation: as frequency 
increases the risk of forgetting is reduced but so too is emotional salience; as frequency 
decreases, garbling and forgetting become more likely but emotional intensity is 
enhanced”. With regard to the imagistic mode we observe, “Such practices trigger 
enduring and vivid episodic memories for ritual ordeals, encouraging long-term 
rumination on the mystical significance of the acts and artefacts involved… Traumatic 
rituals create strong bonds among those who experience them together, establishing in 
people’s episodic memories exactly who was present when a particular cycle of rituals 
took place.” These claims with regard to the effects of memory on the production and 
transmission of religious beliefs, norms, and practices have been a stable feature of the 
modes theory since its inception (Whitehouse 1992, 1995). Moreover, these claims 
were systematically integrated into our models. Czachesz’s comments suggesting 
otherwise are hard to interpret. What might be more to the point is that Model 1 would 
need to be expanded to take account of the longevity of episodic recall for low-
frequency, high-arousal rituals, enabling us to ensure that recurring imagistic outbursts 
produce novel semantic networks rather than repeating earlier ones (a point to which 
we return in our concluding paragraph). 
  
Czachesz maintains that “empirical work has not confirmed… predictions about the 
imagistic mode”, a claim that rests on a single publication (Konvalinka et al., 2011). The 
study cited measured heart rates among a range of observers and participants in an 
emotionally arousing ritual (fire walking) and concluded that levels of emotional arousal 
(using heart rate as a proxy) were equally high among fire walkers and those members 
of the audience related to them (by kinship or close association) but not among 
audience members who were unrelated, or more distantly related. This is an interesting 
study but certainly does not disconfirm any predictions of the modes theory. If the claim 
merely that it ‘has not confirmed’ it either, this is a rather odd statement because the 
study in question was not intended to test predictions of the modes theory. 
Although many of the points raised by Czachesz left us somewhat puzzled, we welcome 
his query about whether the doctrinal-imagistic oscillation in the Model 1 is 
generalizable to other religions (he asks whether it applies generally to ‘pre-state’ 
societies but that is not really a relevant question since it has never been proposed that 
doctrinal traditions and patterns of splintering within them are found particularly or 
only in ‘pre-state’ societies). A central goal of our article was to show how models could 
be used to explore the implications of evidence-based theories. So it is entirely 
appropriate to ask where the evidence for our modeling assumptions comes from. We 
cited evidence for the generalizability of the oscillation simulated in Model 1, but a 
more general articulation of Czachesz’s concern is provided by Chattoe-Brown when he 
writes: “It may be that the authors are very clear what are data, what are assumptions 
(needed to make the model ‘work’ absent data) and what are results, but unless the 
skeptical ‘subject specialist’ is kept excruciatingly clear about these distinctions, they 
may draw unfavourable conclusions.” Chattoe-Brown’s suggestion that we tag each 
assumption of a given model as either supported by data (sources cited) or currently 
unsupported is well taken. Perhaps this should be standard practice in all efforts to 
model complex social phenomena. From the viewpoint of presentation such a practice 
might seem inelegant (hence ‘excruciating’) but clarity and precision should no doubt 
come before style and readability.  
The simulations reported in our article are focused largely on proximate mechanisms 
rather than on questions of function, adaptation, and selection. Hooper encourages us 
to address the kinds of resource extraction problems that the two modes of religiosity 
might resolve. Chattoe-Brown similarly urges us to consider the ecologies of groups in 
our simulations. We agree that these are important issues and plan to tackle them 
directly in the next wave of models to be developed (though see our earlier comments 
on complexity). The work presented in the current paper is merely a foundation on 
which to build, as demonstrated by some of our commentators who have done so. 
Nevertheless, Hooper’s comments on the kinds of issues at stake are remarkably 
penetrating, as for instance where he observes: “we might speculate that doctrinal 
practices facilitating norm enforcement (e.g. top-down pedagogy, religious courts) may 
be better suited to achieving cohesion at the scale of, say, world religions, while 
imagistic practices promoting social bonding (e.g. mutilating rituals) may be better 
suited for bringing together smaller, more intimate communities.” Indeed, we may soon 
do more than speculate since we are gathering increasingly systematic evidence in 
support of this prediction, not only from comparative ethnography but also from 
archaeology, historiography, and from a host of new experiments and surveys 
investigating the relationship between ritual and the scale and structure of social groups 
(http://www.cam.ox.ac.uk/ritual/).  
 
A key strand of our argument, echoed by Costopolous, was that one of the considerable 
benefits of modeling is to establish whether our theories are internally consistent. 
Sometimes lacunae and gaps in our theories dawn on us for the first time in the process 
of designing models and sometimes only when analyzing the results. But it can also 
happen that such problems are identified and debated for the first time after the 
models are published. This could hardly be demonstrated more clearly than in the 
commentary by McCorkle & Lane. They point out that our model of the oscillation 
between mainstream and splinter group systems in Model 1 is incomplete. And they 
demonstrate one way of filling in that gap by modifying the code. This encourages us to 
attend not only to issues of internal consistency in the model but to questions about 
what is happening in the real world when cults collapse but cardinal beliefs persist.  
Moreover, by taking a longer-term view of these oscillations, as McCorkle & Lane do, it 
becomes clear that historically documented innovations in successive splinter groups 
must be informed by memories of previous ones and so future instantiations of Model 1 
would need to reflect this. There is, and should be, a two-way street between research 
in the real world and modeling in a simulated environment. It is this potential for a 
productive back-and-forth between reality and simulation that we hope our article, and 
the commentaries it has provoked, will convey to modeling agnostics. 
 
We were particularly impressed and excited by the improvements and extensions made 
directly to our models and theories by Komarova as well as McCorkle & Lane.  Drawing 
on the tools of theoretical and population biology, Komarova not only reveals 
alternative methods of modeling similar patterns of transformation in religious systems 
but perhaps even more profoundly the possibility that similar mechanisms can emerge 
in different evolutionary systems. The parallels Komarova postulates between imagistic 
dynamics and colonies of cancer cells exhibiting the ‘mutator phenotype’ are striking 
and potentially open up new questions about the nature of activist religions in general 
(and cargo cults in particular), for instance concerning patterns and rates of spread as 
compared with missionary teachings exhibiting much lower rates of mutation. What 
might seem a fanciful analogy could turn out to be a novel insight into processes of 
religious evolution when a common mechanism is specified with the mathematical 
precision that modeling provides. These encouraging and constructive results even in 
the brief period allowed them for the preparation of commentaries demonstrate the 
utility of scientific communication through open-source model sharing. A common 
pattern in the scientific use of ABM is the redescription where possible of the simulation 
findings more formally in mathematics.  Where multiple methods and tools for 
reasoning can be brought together in this way and their results correlate, we can have 
greater confidence that we are making progress theoretically. 
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